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Abstract
In Australia, the USA and many Asian countries the life insurance industry is self-regulated. Individuals must disclose
genetic test results known to them in applications for new or updated policies including cover for critical care, income
protection and death. There is limited information regarding how underwriting decisions are made for policies with such
disclosures. The Australian Financial Services Council (FSC) provided de-identiﬁed data collected on applications with
genetic test result disclosure from its life insurance member companies 2010–2013 to enable repetition of an independent
examination undertaken of applications 1999-2003: age; gender; genetic condition; testing result; decision-maker; and
insurance cover. Data was classiﬁed as to test result alone or additional other factors relevant to risk and decision. Where
necessary, the FSC facilitated clariﬁcation by insurers. 345/548 applications related to adult-onset conditions. The genetic
test result solely inﬂuenced the decision in 165/345 applications: positive (n= 23), negative (n= 139) and pending (n= 3).
Detailed analyses of the decisions in each of these result categories are presented with speciﬁc details of 11 test cases.
Policies with standard decisions were provided for all negative test results with evidence of reassessment of previous non-
standard decisions and 20/23 positive results with recognition of risk reduction strategies. Disclosure of positive results for
breast/ovarian cancer, Lynch syndrome and hereditary spastic paraplegia, and three pending results, generated non-standard
decisions. The examination demonstrates some progress in addressing concerns in regard to utilisation of genetic test
information but the self-regulatory system in Australia only goes some way in meeting internationally recommended best
practice.
Introduction
Underwriting describes the process whereby a life
insurance company assesses the risk of claiming carried
by an applicant in order to determine the cost charged for
cover of that risk [1]. Life insurance products include
cover for death; trauma that provides payment if a person
is diagnosed with a speciﬁed serious illness or injury,
including the major illnesses or injuries that will make a
signiﬁcant impact on a person’s life, such as cancer or a
stroke; total and permanent disability (TPD) that pays a
lump sum if the person becomes totally and permanently
disabled; disability income (DI) that replaces the income
lost due to a person’s inability to work due to injury or
sickness; and business expenses (BE) [2]. The assessment
of risk is informed by a number of factors that include
age; gender; lifestyle; personal and family medical
information; and the type of cover applied for [3]. Living
Beneﬁt policies such as cover for trauma, TPD and DI are
associated with different chances of making a claim than
pure death policies and correspondingly higher premiums
are charged. The commercial nature of life insurance
means that different companies apply different charges
for similar products according to commercial-in-
conﬁdence information underpinned by an underwriting
manual.
Depending on an applicant’s age, gender and other
common inﬂuencing factors such as smoking, each com-
pany will either accept and offer a policy as standard and
charge a standard premium or make a non-standard decision
which may include a loading on the premium (higher
charges), an exclusion of claim for particular conditions or
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the term of coverage may be limited. In accordance with the
governing legislation, where policies are mutually rated,
applicants are required to disclose all information known to
them relevant to their risk, when asked by the insurer [4]. It
is also a requirement for the insurers to assess the risk
appropriately, using statistical or actuarial data where that is
available or else using other information on which it is
appropriate to rely, and also to take into account any
medical surveillance or preventive health strategies adopted
by the insurance applicant [5]. In Australia many of these
requirements are formalised as Standards by the Financial
Services Council (FSC) that represents almost 100% of
Australian companies involved in the provision of life
insurance policies [6]. Once a life insurance policy has been
established it is guaranteed renewable: if premiums are paid,
there is no requirement to disclose any changes to circum-
stances [4].
While an insurance applicant’s genetic information has
long been inferred from their family history, the increased
availability and decreasing costs of genetic testing means
that genetic test results could increasingly contribute to
the underwriting information that insurers seek. Inter-
nationally, the potential for genetic discrimination (GD),
deﬁned as adverse treatment on the basis of an indivi-
dual’s actual or presumed genetic makeup, has been
reported as a primary concern for individuals considering
predictive genetic testing for adult onset conditions,
speciﬁcally in relation to employment and insurance
[7, 8]. Joly et al (2017a and 2017b) documented the range
of responses to this concern that many countries have
implemented to limit the potential for GD: moratoria,
ethical guidance, self-regulation, sectoral prohibition,
genetic exceptionalism, human rights and hybrids;
while others have instead maintained the status quo
[9, 10]. International insurance think-tanks have similarly
been active in classifying the various approaches differ-
ent countries have taken towards the use of genetic test
information when underwriting life insurance policies
[11]. The Australian life insurance industry is self-
regulated as occurs in the USA and in many Asian
countries [12, 13].
The Australian Government broadly accepted the
recommendations in the report from an Inquiry held into the
Protection of Human Genetic Information conducted by
the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the
Australian Health Ethics Committee, 2000–2003, that,
in relation to life insurance, the status quo should
apply whereby applicants must disclose all information
known to them that is relevant to their risk assessment [12].
Nevertheless, a number of recommendations were also
made as a quid pro quo for this decision, the implementa-
tion of which was a matter for the FSC - formally known as
Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA) - and
the Insurance Council of Australia [13]. Some of
these recommendations have been incorporated into
FSC self-regulation Standards that mandate the industry’s
practice in regard to genetic testing and family
history respectively: Standards 11 and 16 [14, 15]. These
include that insurers should not request new genetic
tests as part of a risk assessment but that any genetic test
result known to the applicant needs to be disclosed
and the insurer should provide reasons for adverse under-
writing decisions. Insurers should also take into account
surveillance and preventive strategies undertaken
to reduce risk, ensure that risk assessment is underpinned
where possible by relevant actuarial or statistical
data and limit family history disclosure to ﬁrst degree
relatives only.
Internationally, there is debate about the widespread
existence of GD in the life insurance sector, with signiﬁcant
variations between studies and dependent on the genetic
condition, with a number of studies focussing on a single
genetic condition [16]. It needs to be recognised however
that evidence of GD is difﬁcult to obtain with barriers
expressed by consumers in regard to making complaints or
accessing legal remedies [17]. While a number of studies
have sought to investigate GD by obtaining data directly
from insurers, policies that limit insurers collecting genetic
test information make such investigations an increasing
challenge [2, 18, 19].
However in Australia the FSC has been collecting
information annually since 1998 from its members on all
applications for a life insurance product where a genetic
test result has been disclosed as per Standard 11 [20].
Analysis of this data collection provides a unique
opportunity to understand underwriting practices in regard
to genetic test result information. The Genetic Dis-
crimination Project (GDP), a nationwide study
conducted 2000-2005 that used a triangulated
approach to investigate GD from both legal and social
perspectives and with a veriﬁcation component of con-
sumer experiences, accessed the FSC data collected over
the period 1999-2003 for independent examination for
possible GD [2, 20]. Data was available for analysis in
regard to 234/288 individuals who made applications for
one or more insurance products where a genetic
test result was disclosed. Genetic test results reported
included hereditary haemochromatosis (HH, 71%), Hun-
tington disease (HD, 12%) and breast/ovarian cancer (Bra/
Ov, 6%); 67%% and 33% negative and positive results
respectively were disclosed. Analyses indicated that the
majority of the policy decisions that used genetic test
results were informed by risks likely to be relevant to
underwriting within a commercial environment, but
identiﬁed three concerning cases involving breast and
ovarian cancer where very broad exclusions were applied
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or there was a lack of recognition of prophylactic surgery
to reduce risk.
In 2015, the FSC accepted an application to repeat the
independent examination of newer data and compare the
ﬁndings to (1) identify the volume of genetic test results
disclosed in life insurance applications and (2) examine
underwriting decisions in those applications where a posi-




The FSC provided researchers with de-identiﬁed data in
regard to the applicant and the life insurance company
involving all applications containing a genetic test result
disclosure between April-2010 and September-2013
received by the FSC from its member insurance compa-
nies. The period was determined by the collection method
to enable comparison to the data collected 1999–2003 as
from October 2013 the survey form used to input the data
by insurers was changed.
The data were provided in an Excel spreadsheet format,
inclusive of: date of birth, gender and smoking status; the
condition(s) for which the genetic test was undertaken and
genetic test result(s); the cover applied for and the under-
writing decision – whether standard or non-standard (i.e.
loaded, limited, deferred or declined); the inﬂuencing factor
(s) on a non-standard decision (genetic test result, other
medical or non-medical reason); notes relevant to the
decision; the status of the person(s) making the decision
(senior underwriter, chief underwriter or medical ofﬁcer);
and sources of expertise consulted. Applications were for
death, trauma, TPD, DI and/or BE cover.
Clariﬁcation of data
Case-by-case review of insurer comments revealed incon-
sistencies between insurers in the classiﬁcation of the
genetic test result and other factors inﬂuencing the under-
writing decision. It was therefore necessary to reclassify
cases into the following categories: positive; negative;
uninformative (no causative variant affecting function
identiﬁed but testing done due to a family history); het-
erozygous carrier for an autosomal recessive condition;
pending (genetic test initiated or intended and the result not
available at the time of underwriting); and unknown
(genetic test result not provided or unclear from the infor-
mation provided). Cases were also classiﬁed as to whether
applicants were asymptomatic or symptomatic for the
condition or where other medical/non-medical factors were
disclosed and inﬂuential to the underwriting decision.
Data analysis
Through the lens of potential GD, only those cases where
the genetic test result disclosed was by an individual who
was asymptomatic for an adult onset condition at the time
the application was made and where the result was the only
inﬂuencing factor were included for examination of the
underwriting decisions.
Where the actuarial and genetic counselling expertise on
the research team required further assistance in regard to
assessment of the risk associated with the genetic test result,
underwriters and clinical geneticists or genetics experts
were consulted as well as examination of the relevant lit-
erature. Clariﬁcation of cases with unclear results or unclear
decisions was with the relevant insurance companies via the
FSC.
Ethics approval for the study was granted by the Uni-
versity of Sydney’s HREC.
Table 1 Type of life insurance
product requested by 548
applicants and resulting
underwriting decisions
Death Trauma TPD DI BE Other Total Decisions n
(%)
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Standard decision 287 (78) 156 (71) 118 (52) 103
(49)
4 (67) 10 (59) 678 (65)
Loading/exclusion/reduced
sum insured
52 (4) 40 (18) 74 (33) 70 (34) 2 (33) 4 (24) 242 (23)
Deferred 8 (2) 2 (1) 7 (3) 9 (4) 0 0 26 (2)
Declined 23 (6) 22(10) 28 (12) 28 (14) 0 3 (17) 104 (10)
370 (34) 220 (21) 227 (22) 210
(20)
6 (1) 17 (2) 1050
Withdrawn 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 (7)
Pending 19 9 12 17 0 0 57 (93)
Total 1111
TPD total and permanent disability, DI disability income cover, BE business expenses.
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Results
The applicants
In all, 548 individuals disclosed a genetic test result in
applications for a range of policies. Applicants were resi-
dent in all Australian States and Territories, 54% were male
and the majority were aged 30–49 years.
The insurers and decisions
Seven life insurance companies provided the data to the
FSC. While the FSC has about 100 members, not all are life
insurers that offer policies for cover relevant to GD where
individuals are underwritten [6]. Many offer policies under
an umbrella of “group insurance” within the Australian
retirement fund system of superannuation where limited
health information is required [3]. Two companies provided
data in regard to over 50% of the applications. Given the
mandatory requirement under 10.16 of Standard 11 Genetic
Testing Policy, it would be expected that all companies
provided data to the FSC where genetic test results were
disclosed in applications [14].
Of the 548 applications, 41% applied for cover only for
death, trauma, TPD, DI or BE; 27% applied for two of these
products; 23% for three; 8% for four; and 1% for all ﬁve
products. Insurers made 1050 decisions in regard to these
applications; four applications were withdrawn before a
decision was made and for a further 57 applications a
decision was still pending at the time of data collection
(Table 1). Overall, 65% of the underwriting decisions
were standard; 23% non-standard decisions with either
premiums loaded, certain conditions excluded or the sum
insured reduced; 2% deferred; and 10% declined.
203/548 (37%) were excluded: genetic test results relating
to childhood onset conditions (n= 108); pregnancy/fertility
(n= 43); incomplete information or no decision (n= 52)
(Fig. 1). 345/548 (63%) applications that involved
disclosure of a genetic test result for an adult onset condi-
tion were considered valid for analysis in terms of potential
GD.
Genetic testing and adult-onset conditions
Genetic testing was most frequently reported for HH (58%);
inherited susceptibility to cancer (15%); thrombophilia -
Factor V Leiden and/ or prothrombin gene variants affecting
function (9%); cardiovascular conditions (5%); neurode-
generative conditions (4%); and neuromuscular conditions
(3%). Others included coeliac disease (n= 6); polycystic
kidney disease (n= 4); ankylosing spondylitis (n= 2);
diabetes insipidus (n= 2); Ehlers Danlos (n= 1); Gaucher
Disease (n= 1); glaucoma (n= 1); lupus (n= 1); malignant
hypothermia (n= 3); scleroderma (n= 1); and sensory
neuropathy (n= 2) (Table 2).
For 165/345 (47.8%), the genetic test result was the only
inﬂuencing factor on the outcome of applications: indivi-
duals were asymptomatic at the time of genetic testing and
no other medical or non-medical factors were cited
(Table 2). The genetic test results were classiﬁed as negative
Fig. 1 Data collection and analyses process












200 (58) 92 108
Cancer 51 (15) 29 20
Thrombophilia 31 (9) 15 16
Cardiovascular 17 (5) 9 8
Neurodegenerative 13 (4) 10 3
Neuromuscular 9 (3) 6 3
Other conditions 24 (7) 4 20
Total 345 165 (47.8%) 180 (52.2%)
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in 139 (83%) cases; positive in 23 (14%) cases and pending
in 3 (2%) cases (Table 3 and Fig. 1).
For 11/165 cases, the reasons for the decisions made by
the insurers were not self-evident from the data. Further
investigations of these individual decisions were therefore
carried out as test cases: clariﬁcation was facilitated by the
FSC with the insurer (n= 6); and with experts in clinical
genetics or underwriting (n= 5).
Decisions where a genetic test result was the only
factor inﬂuencing outcome
Negative for the family variant affecting function (n= 139)
In all cases the underwriting decision was standard for all
types of insurance product applied for. Conditions included
HH, cancer predisposition, thrombophilia, cardiovascular,
neurodegenerative, neuromuscular and others (Table 3 and
Fig. 1).
Test cases 1, 2, 3 and 4. In four cases the result engen-
dered a reversal to a standard decision from an adverse
decision previously made on the basis of family history:
Bra/Ov cancer (n= 2), colorectal cancer (n= 1), and MYH7
gene associated with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (n= 1).
Details were only provided for the latter: reversal of stan-
dard death, trauma, TPD and DI.
Positive for a variant affecting function (n= 23)
Twenty individuals (11 males/9 females) received standard
decisions for all products they applied for: HH (14/14),
thrombophilia (5/5) and Bra/Ov cancer (1/4) (Table 4). For
HH and the thrombophilias, treatment instituted affected the
decision: venesection to reduce iron levels and antic-
oagulants to prevent deep vein thrombosis respectively. Test
case 5. The 33-year old female non-smoker applicant
who disclosed a positive test result for a BRCA1 gene var-
iant affecting function received a standard decision. FSC
clariﬁcation revealed that risk reduction surgery had
removed her risk.
In three other cases the decision was non-standard
(Table 4). Test case 6. The non-standard decision made by
the Senior Underwriter and Chief Medical Ofﬁcer for a 24-
year old female non-smoker positive for the BRCA2 gene
variant who applied for DI was cover with exclusion of a
claim for any cancer. Test case 7. The non-standard deci-
sion made by the Senior Underwriter and Chief Medical
Ofﬁcer in consultation with “Other medical doctor or
geneticist and Reinsurance company” for a 45-year old
female non-smoker positive for a gene associated with
Lynch syndrome (that was described in the data as MLH6)
who applied for trauma, TPD and DI was given cover with
exclusions of a claim for any cancer on the trauma and TPD
and loading on the DI cover. As the mismatch repair genes
that are associated with Lynch syndrome include MLH1 or
MSH6, but not MLH6, a query was sent to the insurer via
the FSC. Unfortunately, the insurer was unable to locate the
actual ﬁle but noted that the data in regard to the gene name
(MLH6) would have been imported from the information
supplied by the applicant on the personal statement and also
responded in a general way to the issue of the exclusion. It
was stated that a cancer exclusion clause, or an exclusion of
all kinds of malignant tumours, was felt to be necessary, as
a narrower exclusion would not be satisfactory for the
insurer, because of the difﬁculty of proving whether or not a
subsequent tumour is a direct consequence of the particular
gene variant affecting function tested for. It was also stated
that metastases would raise too many medical and legal
questions in attributing their cause and effect. This appears
to have been a commercial judgement by the insurer of the
possible ﬁnancial risks if a subsequent claim occurred.
Test case 8. The non-standard decision made by the Senior
Underwriter and Chief Medical Ofﬁcer for a 33 year old
female positive for SPAST for SPG4 (hereditary spastic
paraplegia type 4) was to decline death, trauma and TPD
cover.
Table 3 Conditions where genetic tests disclosed with no additional
medical or non-medical factors described as inﬂuential on the decision
(n= 165)
Condition Genetic test result
Negative Positive Pending
Hereditary haemochromatosis 78 14
Cancer
Breast/ ovarian 11 2 1
Colorectal 10 1 1







Huntington disease 7 1







Spinocerebellar ataxia type 1 1
Other conditions 4
Total 139 (84.2%) 23 (14.0%) 3 (1.8%)
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Pending results or test planned (n= 3)
Test cases 9 and 10. A 43-year old female non-smoker who
was waiting for test results for Bra/Ov cancer who applied
for cover for death, trauma, TPD and DI and a 31-year old
female non-smoker applicant for cover for DI waiting for
colorectal cancer geteic test results were both declined cover
altogether. Test case 11. A 33-year old male, who planned
on taking a genetic test for HD applied for death and TPD
cover and was declined. The underwriter commented that
“client about to undergo genetic testing due to family
history”.
Discussion
In 2012, about 20% of Australians had policies in place for
personal life insurance products, a level that is likely to be
the same today [21, 22]. Concerns have been raised about
this low ﬁgure given the importance of life insurance in
future planning and support given that in Australia life
insurance is a social good, as has been noted is the case in
Europe [23, 24]. In 2005, of 455,000 Australian insurance
applications processed, 400 involved people who had
genetic tests [22]. The landscape of genetic testing is
broadening to genomic testing and in the last few years has
become cheaper, faster and more accessible, underscoring
the need to understand how insurers will increasingly
underwrite genetic and genomic test results that are dis-
closed in applications for life insurance [5].
In the last 10 years there has been a 90% increase in the
total number of applications involving genetic test dis-
closures, perhaps reﬂecting this increased availability of
genetic testing. Nevertheless those disclosing genetic test
results are still a very small proportion of the total number
of insurance applications made in Australia each year.
Similar to 10 years ago, the majority of results related to
genetic testing for HH, perhaps as it is one of the few DNA
tests where the cost is covered by Australia’s national health
insurance system called Medicare [2, 25]. The proportion of
applications where the genetic test result is the only
inﬂuencing factor on the underwriting decision were also
about the same at around only half of all applications. Yet
consumers may perceive that the genetic test result was the
sole reason for the decision or at least a major inﬂuence -
perhaps perceiving GD - so this underscores the importance
of insurers’ giving applicants the reasons for non-standard
decisions [12]. The data did not provide information as to
whether such notiﬁcation had been issued to applicants.
The proportion of negative test results disclosed had
increased however. A negative test result for a family var-
iant affecting function removes any risk inferred from a
family history. The resulting expected reversal of non-
standard decision to standard was demonstrated in the data
in both this and the previous study. Importantly, informa-
tion used by Genetics Services throughout Australia high-
lights informing patients of the importance of contacting
insurers to have non-standard decisions made on the basis
of family history reversed if a negative result is found [26].
Perhaps increased awareness and advocacy by genetic
counsellors and clinicians in this regard has contributed to
the observed change.
Further, the number of applications where a positive test
result was disclosed almost halved. Where treatment or risk
reducing strategies were possible and implemented these
were recognised and standard decisions offered. However,
in two cases (Bra/Ov cancer and Lynch syndrome), broad
exclusions for any cancer claim were imposed, rather than
exclusion of those cancers associated with the test result.
This also occurred in the previous study [2] and such broad
exclusions remain of concern to patients and their health
professionals. While in the case of Lynch syndrome the
insurer argued that the risk imposed for the variety of
cancers associated was too high for targeted exclusion,
similar arguments would not apply in regard to the BRCA
test result. It is possible that the positive test result for the
applicant at risk for hereditary spastic paraplegia type 4
engendered a level of risk that would be considered too high
for a commercial contract resulting in denial of cover [27].
Denial of cover was also seen where results were pend-
ing or a test planned. An underwriting expert consulted as to
why the decisions were not simply deferred until results
Table 4 Underwriting decisions
for applications with positive
genetic test results
Condition Standard decision (male/female) Non-standard decision (male/female)
Hereditary haemochromatosis 14 (10 males/4 females)
Cancer
- Breast and ovarian 1 (female) 1 (female)
- Lynch syndrome 1 (female)
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were available, noted that standard practice in Australian
underwriting is always to make a deﬁnite decision and
provide certainty. Deferral for six months, for example, may
therefore be perceived as a non-decision. This approach to
underwriting is applied to all cases with pending medical
activity – not just where genetic testing is about to hap-
pen or awaiting results – following an Australian landmark
legal case relating to the remedies available to a life
insurance company when considering non-disclosure [4,
28]. The initial decision to decline does not preclude the
applicant from re-applying at a later date, when the pending
genetic testing has been completed but it was not possible to
assess how clearly the option of reapplying later was set out
to the applicants.
Implications for genetic counselling practice
All Australian genetic testing consent forms include a
clause that the genetic test result may affect the ability of
individuals undergoing genetic tests to obtain some types of
insurance [29]. The Human Genetics Society of Australasia
(HGSA) has produced guidelines for pre-test genetic
counselling that recommend use of educational materials to
support these explanations “such as that developed by NSW
Health’s Centre for Genetics Education” [3, 26, 30]. Their
fact sheet describes an individual’s disclosure obligations
including known personal genetic test results; heath infor-
mation about ﬁrst degree relatives although not their genetic
test result; possible outcomes of an insurance application;
considerations by the underwriter in addition to the test
result, for example, risk reduction strategies; negotiating
with insurers; and dispute resolution [26].
A possible consequence of this increased awareness of
those considering genetic testing is taking out their insur-
ance before having the test, thereby avoiding any disclosure
of a positive test result resulting in an adverse decision or
enabling a reversal if the result is negative for a family
variant affecting function as shown in the data. This may be
a factor in the reduction of positive results disclosed
reported in the data as the insurance is guaranteed renew-
able if they take it out before they have their test. Impor-
tantly, this strategy of genetic counsellors informing
individuals of the insurance implications of genetic testing
and potential to minimise difﬁculties by putting appropriate
insurance in place before undertaking genetic testing is both
ethically and legally justiﬁable. It does not amount to
adverse selection by individuals against insurers because at
the time that an individual applies for their insurance they
do not have greater knowledge than the insurer (as family
history would in any event need to be disclosed). In the
event of positive genetic test results, the insured would have
no reason to re-contact the insurer because as noted, once a
life insurance policy is secured it is guaranteed renewable,
and there is no obligation on the insured to advise of a
change in circumstances.
Limitations
The researchers could not independently check that all appli-
cations were captured for the period of Apr-2010 to Sep-2013,
and hence could not rule out the possibility of under-reporting,
although the mandatory requirements under FSC Standard
11 should act against underreporting. In fact, Barlow-Stewart
et al. identiﬁed that there was some under-reporting of cases of
adverse underwriting in the data collected 1999–2003 [20]. It
must also be recognised that 50% of cases came from only two
companies which may have introduced a bias and making the
results not reﬂective of practice of the industry as a whole.
This may also have impacted on the analyses regarding the
volume of applications with disclosure of genetic tests results
and limit the comparison between the data sets over the 10
years of reporting.
The data did not include whether the genetic test had
been undertaken in the context of a research study or in a
clinical setting. The genetic test result data available was
also limited in lack of details of the variant affecting
function involved that may have informed more precise risk
assessment. Additionally, the number of positive genetic
test results reported is quite small and so the researchers are
very limited in their ability to examine the underwriting
decisions in terms of possible GD. A large number of
individuals applied simultaneously for a range of product
types. The analysis did not determine whether cover may
have been declined for one product but accepted for a dif-
ferent product type (even with modiﬁed terms of coverage).
Further research
Understanding the views of insurers is essential in any
investigation of GD. Of equal importance will be to survey
individuals who have had genetic testing, or who have
considered undertaking genetic testing, about their percep-
tions of the impact of this genetic testing on their life
insurance eligibility. It would also be of great interest to
conduct a similar veriﬁcation study to that of Barlow-
Stewart et al. in regard to applications received 2010-2013
to investigate any under-reporting [20].
Conclusion
The underwriting decisions documented reﬂect an assess-
ment of risk by Australian life insurers that is likely
reﬂective of a commercial interpretation and impact.
However, the landscape of testing is changing, in the con-
text of the broad availability of genetic and genomic testing
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with decreasing costs, resulting in increased complexity of
underwriting. The HGSA has been proactive in urging the
insurance industry to not require disclosure of genetic
testing undertaken as part of a research project as it may
impact upon research participation and to implement a
moratorium on the use of predictive genetic information
pending improved actuarial estimates of the impact of such
information on adverse selection [31]. Similar concerns
were identiﬁed at a meeting of multidisciplinary experts in
Quebec, Canada in 2012, and a number of recommenda-
tions were made for best practice going forward [24]. In
regard to these, the following summarises where Australia is
currently placed: (1) That life insurance policies be avail-
able covering a minimal (ceiling) amount at an affordable
rate and with no health questions asked (including about
genomics) is partially addressed at a limited level through
the Australian retirement Superannuation system [32]. (2)
The recommendation for an establishment of an Indepen-
dent third party (ombudsman/body) with expertise in both
genomics and personal insurance underwriting to address
complaints has not been met [6]. However the data provided
does not indicate whether or not insurers are providing
reasons to inform complaints. (3) Australia meets the
recommendation that information material and frequently
asked questions about genomics and underwriting be
developed [26]. (4) While through the FSC Standards
openly accessible reference documents regarding the prac-
tices of their members on the use of genetic test information
are in place, a recent update to Standard 11 means there is
overall decline in the protection provided [14]. (5) The
independent analysis documented here goes some way in
addressing the recommendation that the industry have an
independent third party perform regular audits of practice.
However, the ad hoc basis on which this has been done, and
the lack of published reports since 2005 of the FSC data, are
caveats.
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